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PSYCHIATRIC EUTHANASIA, MENTAL CAPACITY, AND A SENSE 
OF THE POSSIBLE 
 
MATTHEW RATCLIFFE 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Euthanasia for psychiatric conditions is currently legal in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. It is also highly controversial, as illustrated by some recent, high-profile cases. In this 
paper, I show how a better understanding of the associated phenomenology can inform debate in this 
area. I focus on how phenomenological changes that occur in psychiatric illness can erode the ability 
to experience and entertain certain types of possibility, making some scenarios seem inevitable and 
others impossible. Although strong convictions that originate in competent decisions differ from 
verbal and non-verbal behaviours stemming from losses of possibility, detecting the difference is by 
no means straightforward. I add that a sense of the possible can be sustained, enhanced, or diminished 
by ways of experiencing and relating to other people. Consequently, the extent to which decision-
making capacity is impaired in a given case may vary with interpersonal context. I consider the 
implications of these points for evaluating euthanasia as a response to mental suffering. 
 
KEYWORDS: assisted dying; decision-making; depression; euthanasia; mental capacity; 
phenomenology 
 
INTRODUCTION 
At the time of writing, euthanasia for psychiatric conditions is legal in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, in cases that are judged to involve unbearable and untreatable suffering. There is 
a difference between µeuthanasia¶ (where the physician administers life-ending treatment) and 
µassisted suicide¶ or µassisted dying¶ (where the patient is given the means to end her own 
life). Although I will refer for the most part WRµSV\FKLDWULFHXWKDQDVLD¶my points apply 
equally to assisted dying. Even where these practices are legal, they are highly controversial. 
One case, in particular, received considerable media attention. In the Netherlands, on 26th 
January 2018, a 29-year-old woman called Aurelia Brouwers ended her life by drinking 
prescribed medication. Press reports are consistent in stating that her diagnoses included 
depression from the age of 12, at which time she was also informed that she had borderline 
personality disorder. Other diagnoses followed, including chronic depression, attachment 
disorder, and psychosis. A documentary, recording during the last few weeks of her life, was 
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broadcast by a Dutch television company. The story was also reported by various 
international newspapers, many of which include an evocative photograph taken shortly 
EHIRUH%URXZHUV¶ death, where she is seen clutching a pink cuddly toy dinosaur.1 
 Rates of psychiatric euthanasia in Belgium and the Netherlands remain low. 
According to the Annual Report of the Dutch Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, the 
number of cases there rose from 56 in 2015 to 60 in 2016 and 83 in 2017, but dropped to 67 
in 2018 (See: https://english.euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/annual-reports; last 
accessed 17.01.2020). A recent study of 66 cases in the Netherlands reports that depressive 
disorder was singled out as the main source of distress in 55% of these cases. Other common 
diagnoses included personality disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder, psychosis, anxiety, 
somatoform disorders, eating disorders, and autism. 70% of those concerned were women; 
there was considerable variation in age; and all had tried various other treatments that had 
proved unsuccessful (Kim, De Vries, & Peteet, 2016). A study conducted in Belgium, 
focusing on those who requested euthanasia (where 48% of these requests were ultimately 
approved), reports similar findings (Thienpont et al., 2015). 
Public opinion on the matter is divided. It could be maintained that severe mental 
disorder sometimes consists in a chronic, untreatable illness that inflicts unbearable suffering 
and makes life no longer worth living (e.g. Schuklenk & van de Vathorst, 2015). In contrast, 
one psychiatrist raiseVFRQFHUQVDERXWµPLVVLRQFUHHS¶DQGUHPDUNVRQKRZGHWDFKHGWKe 
SUDFWLFHLVIURPHVWDEOLVKHGPHGLFDOYDOXHV7RTXRWHLWLQYROYHVµNLOOLQJRQUHTXHVWWKH
very kinds of patients to whose hopelessness and helplessness psychiatrists are devoted to 
address¶.RPUDG 
In what follows, I do not take a stance on whether euthanasia and assisted dying are 
ever appropriate responses to human suffering or, more specifically, to the suffering 
associated with psychiatric conditions. Instead, I focus on a problem concerning the use of 
decision-making capacity as a criterion. Advocates of psychiatric euthanasia generally agree 
that it should only be approved where those concerned have the mental capacity required to 
make the decision. Adopting a phenomenological approach, I will describe a specific way in 
which decision-making competence is often compromised in severe psychiatric illness (while 
allowing that it can be compromised in other ways as well), involving an inability to 
experience and contemplate certain kinds of possibility. In so doing, I will emphasize the 
following points: (i) what might look like an outcome of deliberation is sometimes 
symptomatic of an inability to contemplate relevant options and thus a lack of capacity; (ii) 
the difference can be very difficult to discern; (iii) deficits of this kind are likely to have more 
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impact on major life-decisions than on other types of decision. Taken together, these points 
pose an epistemic challenge, one that is seldom explicitly acknowledged or addressed.  
I go on to argue that loss RISRVVLELOLWLHVIURPRQH¶VZRUOGLVLQH[WULFDEOHIURPKRZ
one experiences and relates to other people. +HQFHµFDSDFLW\¶LVQRWVLPSO\VRPHWKLQJ
possessed by an isolated individual. Furthermore, the extent to which it is lacking in a given 
case may depend, to some degree, on interpersonal context. Reconceptualizing capacity in 
this way further complicates the task of assessment. For instance, its presence or absence may 
depend, to some extent, on the relationship and quality of interaction between clinician and 
patient. Psychiatric euthanasia is carefully monitored and regulated (Thienpont et al., 2015; 
Kim, De Vries, & Peteet, 2016). However, it is not at all clear that (a) the distinction between 
loss of possibility and preference for one outcome over another or (b) the role of 
interpersonal relations in nurturing a sense of the possible have been adequately 
acknowledged or integrated into practice. 
  
CONTRACTIONS OF THE POSSIBLE 
Discussions of decision-making competence in clinical contexts often take, as a starting 
point, four aspects of capacity emphasized by the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool 
IRU7UHDWPHQWRUµ0DF&$7-7¶µXQGHUVWDQGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQUHOHYDQWWRWKHLUFRQGLWLRQDQGWKH
recommended treatment, reasoning about the potential risks and benefits of their choices, 
appreciating the nature of their situation and the consequences of their choices, and 
H[SUHVVLQJDFKRLFH¶*ULVVR$SSHOEDXP	+LOO-Fotouhi, 1997, p.1415).2 In the scenario to 
be described here, all four capacities are compromised to some degree. What might look like 
a decision between options p and q, made by evaluating the relevant evidence, in fact 
originates in an inability to even contemplate q and thus to be swayed by any evidence that 
supports q. This impacts RQRQH¶VDELOLW\WRDSSUHFLDWHWKHUHOHYDQFHRILQIRUPDWLRQZHLJKXS
risks and benefits, and comprehend the consequences of choices. Phenomenological changes 
of this nature are also difficult to express and convey to others. My points will apply most 
clearly to severe forms of depression but are compatible with a range of diagnoses and 
comorbidities.  
To clarify the relevant phenomenology and its relationship to decision-making, I will 
first sketch an account of how possibilities are more usually experienced, one that is inspired 
by the phenomenological tradition of philosophy (Ratcliffe, 2008; 2015). Consider the 
mundane experience of a drinking glass on a nearby table. One does not simply perceive a 
QHXWUDOH[WHUQDOREMHFWZKROO\GHWDFKHGIURPRQH¶VYDrious capacities and concerns. Rather, 
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it is encountered as something that one could reach out and touch, view from another angle, 
or pick up and drink from. While some such possibilities might concern perceptual or 
practical activities to which one is currently indifferent (such as turning a glass around to see 
what is pictured on the other side), others -those that tend to be most phenomenologically 
salient- consist of ways in which an actual or anticipated entity, event, or situation matters to 
us. When we are thirsty, how the glass appears significant reflects our current needs and 
concerns.  
There are many ways in which entities, events, and situations are experienced as 
µVLJQLILFDQW¶RUµPDWWHULQJ¶,XVHWKHVHWHUPVLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\6RPHWKLQJPLJKWSresent 
itself as able to satisfy a current desire or need, as potentially obstructing a project, as 
immediately threatening or harbouring a potential threat, and so forth. As in the case of 
µWKUHDW¶PDQ\RIWKHVLJQLILFDQWSRVVLELOLWLHVWKDWZHH[SHULHQFH take the form of anticipation. 
They involve a variably determinate sense of what is coming next, what might be coming, 
DQGZKDWFRXOGEHDFWXDOL]HGRUDYRLGHGWKURXJKRQH¶VRZQDFWLRQVRUWKRVHRIRWKHUV+HQFH
our sense of the significant possibilities on offer also comprises an orientation towards the 
future. 
Broad types of mattering can be categorized without reference to concrete properties 
of the environment or specific bodily capacities. Something may threaten us physically in 
virtue of any number of concrete properties that it and we possess. But, for current purposes, 
what is of interest is the more general way in which it matters: its being threatening. This can 
be classified in broad or more fine-grained ways, as can other types of significant possibility 
that we experience. Threats can be subdivided into those that are major or minor, immediate 
or longer-term, localized or non-localized, likely or unlikely, avoidable or unavoidable, 
personal or impersonal in origin, and determinate or indeterminate in nature. It is debatable 
which distinctions a comprehensive taxonomy should include ± which differences the 
structure of human experience is sensitive to and how various kinds of mattering relate to one 
another. Nevertheless, I assume at least that we do experience things as mattering in various 
ZD\V3KLORVRSKHUV¶YLHZVFRQFHUQLQJWKHQDWXUHRISHUFHSWXDOFRQWHQWYDU\FRQVLGHUDEO\
But, regardless of whether these ways of mattering are admitted as constituents of specifically 
µSHUFHSWXDO¶H[SHULHQFHLt remains the case that we experience our surroundings as imbued 
with significance, rather than relying exclusively on inferences from our experiences of 
things. Nevertheless, the significant possibilities we experience are not restricted to those that 
adhere to our current surroundings. The contents of our thoughts, memories, and imaginings 
are equally infused with a sense of how things matter. 
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How a specific entity appears significant in a given situation depends on factors of 
four broad types. First, it often reflects our bodily capacities or abilities: what we can and 
cannot do, at that time and more generally. Second, it reflects a range of needs, cares, 
concerns, values, commitments, and projects, all of which are variably idiosyncratic. Third, it 
depeQGVRQRWKHUSHRSOHZKRFRQWULEXWHERWKWRRXUFDSDFLWLHVµ,FDQ¶WGRLWZLWKRXW\RX¶
and to the sustenance or erosion of projects that rely on their participation and cooperation. 
Fourth, it presupposes established norms and roles of various kinds, which are ordinarily 
taken for granted as shared, as integral to our world. 
It follows that happenings of various kinds, involving one or more of these factors, 
can alter the significance that things have for us and are experienced as having. Effects are 
seldom limited to how we experience and engage with a single entity, event, or momentary 
situation. For the most part, how something matters is related to and depends upon ways in 
which a whole host of other things matter. Webs of significance hang together to varying 
degrees and, to the extent that they do, they also fall together. For example, suppose a life-
event were to end my career as an academic philosopher. The train that takes me to work, the 
office that I work in, the computer, the stack of papers on the desk, the books on my shelves, 
my email account - all these things would appear different, in lacking a significance they 
once had. They would no longer show up as an integrated, meaningful whole, held together 
by a taken-for-granted life-project.  
When such upheavals occur, the transition from one to another way of experiencing 
and engaging with our surroundings is not instantaneous or smooth, but more usually 
prolonged and conflicted. Certain things may remain imbued with the possibilities they once 
offered. Yet, at the same time, those possibilities are experienced as no longer applying, as 
lost. Tensions between competing and changing systems of possibility are thus integral to 
how we experience and relate to the world. 
 For current purposes, the point to emphasize is that, even when a wide-ranging system 
of significant possibilities is profoundly disturbed, we remain open to finding things 
significant in the relevant ways. That p, q, r, and many other things now lack a significance 
they once possessed does not imply an inability to encounter anything as significant in that 
way again; we can still remember, imagine, and anticipate doing so. Hence, while a concrete 
system of significant possibilities is lost, phenomenological access to the relevant types of 
possibility endures and our deliberations remain receptive to them. However, certain forms of 
experience associated with diagnoses of severe psychiatric illness are different. It is not 
merely that numerous entities, events, and situations cease to be significant in a given way. 
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Rather, one no longer experiences or anticipates experiencing things in that way; a type of 
SRVVLELOLW\LVJRQHIURPRQH¶VZRUOG 
Alterations of the phenomenological possibility-space can take various forms. For 
instance, someone might still be able to imagine and anticipate certain kinds of possibility but 
fail to discover them in her experienced surroundings. Consequently, her experience is 
riddled with unfulfilled expectation. Alternatively, she might remain capable of experiencing 
certain kinds of possibility but fail to anticipate or imagine them. So, although she cannot 
conceive of ever successfully pursuing these possibilities and therefore makes no attempt to 
do so, she remains able to experience their actualization.  
 This account of how we experience the possible is consistent with a substantial and 
diverse body of testimony offered by people with psychiatric illness diagnoses. Indeed, 
appealing to the phenomenology of possibility and its vulnerability to disruption is, I 
maintain, the only plausible way of interpreting these testimonies. Furthermore, it provides a 
remarkable degree of consilience, as a unifying framework that illuminates a range of 
different and otherwise puzzling forms of experience (Ratcliffe, 2008; 2015; 2017). Consider 
the following first-person description, obtained via a questionnaire study that I conducted 
with colleagues as part of a larger project on depression (as were other testimonies quoted in 
this paper, unless otherwise stated):3 
 
Life seems completely pointless when depressed. Depression is the worst feeling in the 
ZRUOGDQGZKHQ\RX¶UHDEVRUEHGLQLWVGHSWKV\RXMXVWGRQ¶WHYHQZDQWWREHWKHUH
anything to stop the numEQHVVDQGSDLQ<RXFDQ¶WVHHIDULQWRWKHIXWXUHVR\RXFDQ¶W
see aspirations or dreams. Everything I ever wanted to do with my life before seemed 
LPSRVVLEOHQRZ,DOVRZRXOGWKLQNWKDW,ZRXOGQHYHUJHWRXWWKDW,¶GEHGHSUHVVHG
forever. It brings quite LUUDWLRQDOWKLQNLQJEHFDXVHLW¶s not a rational illness. It makes 
\RXWKLQNDOOVRUWVRIWKLQJVDERXWOLIHDQG\RXUVHOIWKDWDUHQ¶WWUXH,WKRXJKW,¶GQHYHU
escape from the depths of depression and never achieve anything with my life. 
 
To over-simplify somewhat, what seems to be lacking here (and in many other cases) 
is the sense that anything could ever change in a good way, that the future incorporates the 
SRWHQWLDOIRUSRVLWLYHFKDQJH2QH¶VH[SHULHQFHGVXUURXQGLQJVGHOLEHUDWLRQVDQd imaginings 
are devoid of that possibility. Even the past may be remembered as lacking positive 
development: it feels as though one has never been happy, that nothing good has ever 
happened, that nothing has ever improved. This amounts to the unwavering conviction that 
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things were always like this, always will be like this, and could not be otherwise; nothing 
seems more certain. Deliberation therefore occurs against the backdrop of an all-enveloping 
way of finding oneself in the world, one that includes no sense of its own contingency 
(Ratcliffe, 2008; 2015). This inevitably compromises the ability to evaluate treatment options 
(Meynen, 2011). As Hindmarch, Hotopf, & Owen (2013, p.3) put it, what is lacking is a kind 
RIµDSSUHFLDWLYHDELOLW\¶,QWKHPRVWHxtreme case we might envisage, all sense of positive 
change is lacking. Therefore, treatment options cannot be understood or evaluated in terms of 
the relative likelihood of their facilitating improvement.  
The difference between a predicament of this nature and a decision that involves 
HYDOXDWLQJRQH¶VRSWLRQVLQWKHOLJKWRISRWHQWLDORXWFRPHVQHHGQRWEHHYLGHQWWRDQ
interpreter. Inability to contemplate the possibility of p is easily misconstrued as a matter of 
weighing up the costs and benefits of p and q, and then opting for q. There are many ways in 
which the impossibility of p might be expressed, all of which could be assimilated into 
alternative interpretations that presuppose intact decision-making. Indeed, inability to 
contemplate p is compatible with being able to voice good reasons for q. But, in a case where 
q is already rendered inevitable by an inability to entertain p, these reasons have no role to 
play in the decision. And, even where q is more specific in nature, such that reasons do play a 
role in nudging one towards it, they cannot be countered by reasons in support of a 
contrasting option, p.  
This phenomenological approach is to be distinguished from cognitive theories of 
depression, of the kind that emphasize cognitive biases, styles, schemata, and the like, which 
contribute to the formation of beliefs. A loss of certain types of possibility from the 
experiential world is not itself a propositional belief or system of beliefs. Furthermore, the 
person is not merely disposed to adopt certain propositional beliefs rather than others, such as 
µ,ZLOOQHYHUUHFRYHU¶RUµUHFRYHU\LVLPSRVVLEOH¶:hat might look like a specific, 
propositional belief is in fact the expression of a much wider-ranging change in the structure 
of experience, which renders certain predicaments unintelligible and others seemingly 
inevitable (Ratcliffe, 2015). 
In light of these considerations, it is informative to revisit the case of Aurelia 
%URXZHUV2QHSUHVVUHSRUWTXRWHGDµVXSSRUWHU¶DVVD\LQJµVKHQHver had a moment of doubt 
WKDWVKHZDQWHGLWWRHQG¶www.theguardian.com/society/2018/mar/17/assisted-dying-
euthanasia-netherlands; last accessed 17.01.2019). This level of conviction could be 
construed in terms of considering the alternatives and finding them all inferior. However, it 
could just as well involve an inability to entertain relevant alternatives, let alone to gauge 
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their relative likelLKRRGV%URXZHUVKHUVHOILVTXRWHGDVVD\LQJµ,KDYHQHYHUEHHQKDSS\± I 
GRQ¶WNQRZWKHFRQFHSWRIKDSSLQHVV¶e.g., www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-45117163; last 
accessed 17.01.2019). Perhaps it is true that she had never been happy, but her remark is 
equally consistent with an inability to imagine, remember, or anticipate happiness.4 The 
difference is an important one: a person does not have the capacity to make a decision 
motivated by q where (a) the decision requires being able to weigh up the relative likelihoods 
of p and q and (b) one lacks the ability to contemplate the possibility of p. Thus, if it is 
accepted that psychiatric euthanasia should only be approved only in cases where that 
capacity remains intact, we face the epistemic challenge of distinguishing two superficially 
similar but importantly different predicaments. This challenge is seldom acknowledged, let 
alone addressed. 
That deficits of this kind do indeed occur is indicated by numerous first-person 
accounts of severe psychiatric illness, all of which emphasize an inability to grasp that things 
could be any different. For example:  
 
:KHQ,¶PGHSUHVVHGOLIHQHYHUVHHPVZRUWKOLYLQJ,FDQQHYHUWKLQNDERXWKRZP\OLIH
is diffeUHQWIURPZKHQ,¶PQRWGHSUHVVHG,WKLQNWKDWP\OLIHZLOOQHYHUFKDQJHDQGWKDW
I will always been depressed. Thinking about the future makes my depression even 
ZRUVHEHFDXVH,FDQ¶WEHDUWRWKLQNRIEHLQJGHSUHVVHGP\ZKROHOLIH,IRUJHWZKDWP\
life iVOLNHZKHQ,¶PQRWGHSUHVVHGDQGIHHOWKDWP\OLIHDQGIXWXUHLVSRLQWOHVV 
 
The experienced impossibility of positive change is a common theme in published 
autobiographical accounts of depression. What often does turn out to be temporary and what 
one might even know (in a hollow, ineffectual, propositional way) to be temporary still feels 
eternal in a manner that holds sway over the person:  
 
,ZDVDGYLVHGWRµKDQJLQWKHUH'DYHWKHSDLQZLOOSDVV¶7KLVZDVWUXHHQRXJK± LW¶V
just that I found it unbelievable at the time. (Webb, 2010, p.4) 
 
I have absolutely no faith, in fact, in anything. In a muddy way, I see that depression 
manifests itself as a crisis of faith. Not religious faith, but the almost born instinct that 
things are fluid, that they unfold and change, that new kinds of moment are eventually 
possible, that the future will arrive. I am in a time-locked place, where the moment I am 
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in will stretch on, agonizingly, for ever. There is no possibility of redemption or hope. 
It is a final giving up on everything. It is death. (Lott, 1996, pp.246-7) 
 
In the middle of a depressive episode, it is impossible to believe it will pass. It is, oddly, 
DSUREOHPRIEHOLHYLQJWKDWRQHLVVHHLQJWKHZRUOGµDVLWUHDOO\LV¶DQGXQDEOHRU
unwilling to put a gloss on that perception. (Burnard, 2006, p.244) 
 
Experiences of this kind do, to some extent at least, resemble strong feelings of 
conviction that are compatible with competent decision-making. A given decision or belief 
often feels right to the extent that all the alternatives cease to have any affective pull. There is 
thus a comparable sense of certainty surrounding that decision or belief: I am sure I should 
marry this person, take this job, buy that house, help these people. However, feelings of 
conviction more usually concern concrete propositions or states of affairs, to which various 
kinds of significance may attach. They are therefore importantly different from feeling 
certain about something because one cannot contemplate types of significant possibility. In 
both cases, the feeling of conviction involves a lack of affective pull in any other direction. 
But, in the mundane case, it is situation-specific. Where capacity is lacking, it is a structural 
constraint on all experience and thought, something that is insensitive to differences between 
the potential outcomes one considers. 
 
CAPACITY AND CONTEXT 
Where there is a non-localized loss of possibilities, not all decisions need be impaired in the 
same way or to the same degree. The relevant phenomenology encompasses considerable 
variety, both in the extent to which possibilities are eroded and in the kinds of possibility that 
are eroded. Whatever form it takes, it is likely to affect different types of decision in different 
ways, as not all decisions involve reckoning with the same kinds of possibility. Where all 
VHQVHRISRVLWLYHGHYHORSPHQWLQRQH¶VRZQOLIH is lacking, one might remain able to make 
various other evaluative judgments: distinguish a good film from a bad one, determine what 
is the right or wrong thing to do in a situation where established, shared norms apply, perhaps 
appreciate what others should do in certain circumstances, and so forth.  
Lack of capacity can also be context-sensitive: that something seems inevitable or 
impossible may reflect a privation of imagination, memory, and / or and anticipation that is 
not present to the same degree in practically engaged perceptual experience. While someone 
PLJKWMXGJHµ,FDQ¶WGRp¶DQGGHFLGHDFFRUGLQJO\KHUVHQVHRIWKHSRVVLEOHFRXOGFKDQJH
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once she is immersed in the relevant situation. So, what I am concerned with here is not 
simply a matter of lacking all sense that the future could differ in consequential ways from 
the present. As Owen at al. (2015) observe, even very severely depressed patients retain 
FHUWDLQµWHPSRUDODELOLWLHV¶ZKHQPDNLQJGHFLVLRQV5 For instance, they experience themselves 
as situated at a distinctive point in time, appreciate time constraints, and make decisions that 
involve preferring some situations to others (such as wanting to discontinue an interview and 
UHWXUQWRRQH¶VURRP*LYHQWKLVLWPLJKWDSSHDUWKDWGHFLVLRn-making capacity remains 
intact. However, Owen et al. go on to show how discerning interviews can reveal profound 
GHILFLWV:KLOHVRPHRQHPLJKWFRQWLQXHWRXWWHUSODWLWXGHVVXFKDVµ,KRSHVR¶LQUHVSRQVHWR
questions about what the future holds, impaired ability to contemplate positive change is 
more apparent when one attempts to elicit specific expressions of hope with concrete 
contents. In severe cases, at least, there is a change in the structure of temporal experience: a 
diminished sense of there being an open, meaningful future into which one might progress. 
Consequently, there is a lack of capacity to make decisions that involve evaluating one 
potential autobiographical future as preferable to another. Lack of capacity therefore involves 
GHJUHHVRIµdecision-VSHFLILFLW\¶2ZHQHWDO, 2015, p.177).  
For current purposes, I restrict my considerations to extreme cases, where one is 
unable to contemplate WKHSURVSHFWRISRVLWLYHFKDQJHLQRQH¶VRZQOLIH6RPHGHFLVLRQVDUH
more important than others, and the stakes are especially high when the decision is whether to 
OLYHRUGLH$VRQHSV\FKLDWULVWREVHUYHVµLWVHHPVUHDVRQDEOHWRLQVLVWRQDSURJUHVVLYHO\
more stringent test of competence as the stakes become higher in terms of the magnitude and 
probabiOLW\RISRVVLEOHKDUPWRWKHSDWLHQW¶<RXQJ&RUE\	-RKQVRQS7KLVLV
even more so when it is acknowledged that losses of possibility can be expressed in ways that 
resemble (superficially, at least) rationally evaluating the available evidence and making a 
decision. Furthermore, the kinds of decisions most likely to be compromised are those that 
involve anticipating how we might feel in certain circumstances and acting in order to realize 
or avoid the relevant feelings. Not all decisions take that form. For instance, I might do 
something because I judge it to be the morally right thing to do or because I am 
professionally obliged to do it. Even if one insists that no such actions would be performed in 
the absence of the positive feelings that they elicit (something I am doubtful of), the explicit 
aim of the action is not to change how one feels but to bring about something else, which 
PLJKWLQWXUQKDYHWKHHIIHFWRIDOWHULQJRQH¶Vfeelings.  
Charland (e.g. 1999) has suggested that instruments such as the MacCAT-T fail to 
accommodate the important contributions that emotions make to decision-making. In short, 
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decision-making requires evaluation, which depends on emotion. My position here is 
consistent his criticism, but more specifically focused. I am concerned with how disturbance 
of a certain type of affective feeling gives rise to a distinctive kind of evaluative impairment: 
a diminished ability to appreciate the contingency of RQH¶VFXUUHQWSUHGLFDPHQW. µ)HHOLQJ¶LQ
this context, should not be construed solely as a matter of localized affective experiences. It 
DOVRHQFRPSDVVHVµH[LVWHQWLDOIHHOLQJ¶DFKDQJHDEOHVHQVHRIUHDOLW\DQGEHORQJLQJZKLFK
can be understood in terms of phenomenological access to various types of possibility 
(Ratcliffe, 20087KHSRLQWLVWKDWLIRQH¶VFXUUHQWH[LVWHQWLDOIHHOLQJRUway of finding 
oneself in the world renders one impervious to its own contingency and potential for change, 
this will inevitably impact on the capacity to make decisions that are explicitly concerned 
with manipulating the feeling in question. Thus, as Banner (2013) argues, an exclusively 
procedural conception of capacity is unworkable in practice and the FRQWHQWVRIWKHSHUVRQ¶V
beliefs, values, and decisions also need to be taken into consideration. In the type of case I am 
concerned with, this is because the ability to factor possible outcomes into decision-making is 
retained for some outcomes and not others. Whether or not one is able to deliberate therefore 
GHSHQGVRQWKHFRQWHQWVRIRQH¶VGHOLEHUDWLRQV 
One could respond that there are sometimes compelling medical grounds for taking the 
SDWLHQW¶VVHOI-appraisal to be correct, that some cases really are hopeless. For instance, 
Berghmans, Widdershoven, & Widdershoven-Heerding (2013) and Schuklenk & van de 
Vathorst (2015) argue that some cases of chronic and severe psychiatric illness are both 
unbearable and untreatable, and that euthanasia may well be an appropriate course of action 
here. It is questionable whether any cases really are wholly untreatable or even what is meant 
E\µXQWUHDWDEOH¶LQWKLVFRQWH[W(Bilkshavn, Husum, & Magelssen, 2017; Broome & de Cates, 
2015). However, even if we accept that this clinical judgment is accurate in some cases, the 
issue of capacity remains. Suppose that (a) a patient concludes that that she has no realistic 
chance of recovery from unbearable suffering and therefore requests euthanasia, and (b) the 
physician also concludes that this patient has no realistic chance of recovery from unbearable 
suffering. If decision-PDNLQJFDSDFLW\LVDQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQIRUWKHUHTXHVW¶VDSSURYDO
WKHQWKHSDWLHQW¶VDSSUDLVDORIKHUVLWXDWLRQPXVWOLNHWKDWRIWKHSK\VLFLDQRULginate in a 
competent decision-making process. Being unable to conceive of the contrary does not fit the 
bill - WKHSDWLHQW¶VVWUHQJWKRIFRQYLFWLRQthe feeling of certainty, stems from privation of the 
ability to entertain relevant alternatives. Even if recovery were medically guaranteed, she 
would still insist on its impossibility. To approve a request for euthanasia, while at the same 
time recognizing its imperviousness to situational factors, would be to rely on the decision-
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making capacity of the clinician rather than that of the patient. One might take the line that, 
where there really is unbearable and untreatable suffering, this is sometimes justifiable. Given 
WKDWWKHSDWLHQW¶VFDSDFLW\LVlacking but not entirely absent, the input of the clinician could be 
conceived of as a form of support or µVFDIIROGLQJ¶WKDWFRPSHQVDWHVfor certain deficits in 
capacity. However, so far as I am aware, none of those who support the practice have sought 
to develop, defend, or implement such a view. 
But are there other cases, where a person endures unbearable suffering due to 
psychiatric illness and does retain the decision-making capacity required to choose 
euthanasia? Broome & de Cates (2015) suggest that there may be no actual instances where 
(a) a psychiatric FRQGLWLRQLVVHYHUHHQRXJKWRZDUUDQWHXWKDQDVLDDQGEWKHSHUVRQ¶V
capacity to make the decision remains intact. To put it in my terms, loss of possibility is 
integral to suffering and WKHVHQVHWKDWµWKLVLVLQHVFDSDEOHDQGZLOOJRRQIRUHYHU¶SOD\VD
major role in rendering it unbearable.6 One might go so far as to suggest that, where the 
suffering attributable to a chronic psychiatric condition is so severe that a euthanasia request 
is considered seriously, the patient will inevitably lack the capacity needed to make the 
decision. µUQEHDUDEOHSV\FKLDWULFVXIIHULQJ¶is thus conceived of in such a way as to render it 
incompatible with intact capacity. More generally, though, unbearable suffering can take 
many different forms and there are insufficient grounds for maintaining that, in the context of 
psychiatry, it invariably incorporates an inability to even contemplate the possibility of 
SRVLWLYHFKDQJHLQRQH¶VOLIH. Nevertheless, the fact that loss of possibilities can be partly 
constitutive of µunbearable suffering¶ suggests that degree of suffering in psychiatric contexts 
will often be associated with diminished ability to contemplate alternatives.7 
 
THE INTERPERSONAL AND THE POSSIBLE 
Up to this point, I have drawn on phenomenology to raise an epistemic issue: inability to 
contemplate p is easily mistaken for that belief that not p, formed by weighing up the 
respective likelihoods of p and not p. However, one could also take the line that the very 
QRWLRQRIµFDSDFLW\¶IDLOVWRFDSWXUHWKHQDWXUHRIimpaired decision-making in psychiatric 
illness and that a phenomenological approach may provide the basis for an alternative 
(Donnelly (2017). In this section, I will address one way in which a phenomenological 
account of experiencing the possible at least complicates how we think of decision-making 
capacity. 
A sense of positive life-development as impossible is inextricable from a change in 
how one experiences and relates to other people. This is not to insist that the relevant 
13 
 
predicament is always or even sometimes interpersonally caused. Rather, I am making a 
constitutive claim: a world devoid of certain kinds of possibility implies a pervasive 
detachment from other people, and vice versa. First-person accounts of severe psychiatric 
illness often convey a non-localized feeling of estrangement and detachment from other 
people. Others in general may seem distant and inaccessible. For some, the interpersonal 
world is permeated by lack of trust and an air of threat or menace. Many emphasize being a 
µEXUGHQ¶RQRWKHUVVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVFORVHOy associated with shame, guilt, self-hate and / or 
negative feelings directed at other people for not caring, for making one feel like a burden. 
For example: 
 
The world appears to be a frightening place full of people who are bad and threatening. 
 
I always IHHODVWKRXJKWKH\¶UHIHGXSRIPHWKDWWKH\GRQ¶WZDQWWREHDURXQGPH
GHVSLWHKRZORYLQJWKH\PD\EHDFWLQJ,IHHOOLNH,¶PDWHUULEOHEXUGHQDQGWKH\ZRXOG
be better off without me around. 
 
:KHQ,¶PGHSUHVVHG,IHHOOLNHP\UHODWLRQVKLSVDUHOHVVVtable and I trust others a lot 
less. I try to avoid people, as they seem angry and irritated at me, and like they don't 
ZDQWPHDURXQG,IHHOOLNHDEXUGHQWRRWKHUVDQGGRQ¶WZDQWWRFDXVHDQ\RQH
unnecessary distress. 
 
3HRSOHGRQ¶WOLNHPH,¶PDEXUGHQ WKH\EHFRPHSDWURQL]LQJEHFDXVHWKH\NQRZ,FDQ¶W
FRSH:KHQWKH\FDUHLW¶VEHFDXVHWKH\KDYHWR- and their happiness always seems to 
be in spite of me, never because of me, and I know I get in their way. 
 
The reason why forms of interpersonal experience such as these are inextricable from 
losses of possibility is that experienced and anticipated interactions with other people more 
usually involve opening up new possibilities. Expecting a given type of interaction with a 
particular individual may involve anticipating some quite specific eventualities, from meeting 
for coffee, to working on a joint project, to having a heated discussion about something or 
other. However, when anticipating interpersonal interactions of whatever kind, there is also a 
less determinate sense of other people in general as loci of self-affecting possibilities, as 
pointing to the possibility of new possibilities (Ratcliffe, 2018). The prospect of relating to 
RWKHUVLQFHUWDLQZD\VDPRXQWVWRDNLQGRIµRSHQQHVV¶LWis to experienFHRQH¶VFXUUHQW
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predicament as contingent, as not exhausted by the concrete possibilities that one is currently 
able to entertain. In contrast, other kinds of interpersonal encounter involve a diminishment 
of possibilities. Most of us can recall conversations that left us feeling invigorated, filling the 
world with new and enticing possibilities, to be contrasted with awkward or outright 
distressing encounters than left us feeling deflated and diminished, draining our surroundings 
of vitality (Ratcliffe, 2018).  
But why accept any of this? After all, a few brief assertions about the nature of 
interpersonal experience are hardly conclusive. We can further support these 
phenomenological claims by turning to the topic of emotion-regulation. It is through our 
various emotions, along with a wider range of affective experiences, that we encounter things 
as salient and significant, that we experience various types of possibility as inherent in them. 
For instance, to find an entity threatening (rather than merely judge it to be a threat) is to feel 
fear, something that involves experiencing a distinctive kind of significant possibility or 
mattering. Our various emotions are not just experienced by us but also regulated in a range 
of often intricate ways, as made clear by the substantial and fast-growing interdisciplinary 
literature on emotion-regulation (e.g., Gross, 2014). In humans, it is arguable that many 
emotion-regulation processes, perhaps the vast majority, are not wholly internal to the 
individual but interpersonally and socially distributed. Even if one declines to endorse this 
strong claim, it remains the case that these processes are in many ways dependent on 
interpersonal, social, and / or cultural arrangements. To regulate our emotions, we rely on 
relationships with specific individuals, on wider sets of expectations concerning other people, 
on many different types of interpersonal interaction, and on engagement with a shared, social 
environment. With or without explicit insight into what we are doing, we relate to our 
surroundings (especially our social surroundings) in ways that shape, maintain, and re-shape 
our emotional responses (Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011; Colombetti & Krueger, 2015; 
Szanto, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2017). This is perhaps most evident when we consider relations 
between infants and carers, where patterned interactions play essential roles in eliciting and 
UHJXODWLQJLQIDQWV¶HPRWLRQDOresponses. However, patterns of co-regulation are also evident 
in adulthood, as illustrated by the effects of spousal bereavement (Ratcliffe, 2019). In fact, it 
has been argued that depression is similar in structure to infant separation, both of which 
cenWUDOO\LQYROYHWKHµIHOWXQDYDLODELOLW\RIRWKHUVDVSRWHQWLDOH[WHUQDOFR-UHJXODWRUV¶9DUJD
& Krueger, 2013, p.273). Consistent with the roles that other people play in emotion-
regulation, I propose that what we anticipate from them includes at least some appreciation of 
their potential influence on how things matter to us.  
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This suggests that how we relate to others has the potential to enhance or diminish 
µFDSDFLW\¶ by affecting our sense of the possible. If that is right, then assessing capacity is not 
just a matter of measuring something internal to an individual. Something else to be taken 
into account is thDWLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\ to anticipate, experience, and relate to others in self-
affecting ways. To be more specific, central to many of the ways in which we engage with 
others is a non-ORFDOL]HGIRUPRIZKDWZHPLJKWFDOOµWUXVW¶DSUH-reflective, non-conceptual, 
default mode of anticipating their behaviour, which takes for granted that exchanges will be 
benign. In contrast to this, consider a world where others appear only in the guise of actual or 
anticipated threat. There is no prospect of positive development; the only sense of 
contingency associated with specifically interpersonal possibilities is the prospect of things 
getting even worse. In a world without trust, one is cut off from various kinds of regulatory 
process and also from the numerous ways in which other people more usually aid us in 
PDNLQJGHFLVLRQV$V0DUWLQ	+LFNHUVRQREVHUYHDOWKRXJKµGHFLVLRQDOFRPSHWHQFH¶
is routinely construed in individualistic terms, most of the important decisions we make -even 
for ourselves- are made with others, against the backdrop of wider communities. Trusting 
UHODWLRQVDUHDSUHUHTXLVLWHIRUWKLV7RWDNHRWKHUV¶DGYLFHRQERDUGWRUegard them as honest, 
committed, and well-meaning, to experience their words, gestures, and actions in terms of 
promising, supporting, consoling, sympathizing, and reassuring ± all of this requires being 
open to the prospect of certain kinds of interpersonal relations. Without this openness, well-
meaning or friendly gestures will be misinterpreted or even experienced as meaning 
VRPHWKLQJGLIIHUHQWµThe world looks entirely different whilst I am depressed. If a person is 
to smile at me whilst I am depressed, I am filled with anxiety, wondering why they are 
ODXJKLQJDWPHDQGXVXDOO\GHFLGHLQP\PLQGWKDWLWLVEHFDXVH,DPKRSHOHVV¶ 
Wide-ranging loss of trust is commonplace among those with diagnoses of severe 
psychiatric illness, and is often associated with autobiographical reports of mistreatment at 
the hands of others, including neglect or abuse during childhood (Fonagy & Allison, 2014; 
Ratcliffe, 2017). It is inextricable from loss of hope, given that one can no longer call upon 
others to repair, sustain, or re-instill the sense of contingency and possibility that is lacking. 
All of this has significant implications for evaluations of capacity. If decision-making 
is ordinarily interpersonally supported, and if a sense of being irrevocably cut off from this 
NLQGRILQWHUSHUVRQDOVXSSRUWLVLQWHJUDOWRRQH¶VVXIIHULQJWKHQFDSDFLW\LVOLNHO\WREH
impaired. Where lack of trust encompasses relationships with healthcare professionals, one 
will not regard them as reliable sources of relevant information, interfering with the ability to 
DFFHVVDQGHYDOXDWHLQIRUPDWLRQGLUHFWO\UHOHYDQWWRRQH¶VFRQGLWLRQ'RQQHOO\
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Nevertheless, loss of trust need not involve refusal to believe everything that is said, and it 
need not apply to all the people one encounters in exactly the same way. Indeed, pervasive 
GLVWUXVWPD\UHPDLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKµWUXVWLQJ¶WKHWHVWLPRQ\RIVRPHRQHZKRDFNQRZOHGJHV
DQGVXSSRUWVRQH¶VFRQYLFWLRQWKDWUHFRYHU\LVLPSRVVLEOH 
Consider an analogy. Suppose that, for several months, you have had a growing sense 
of failing in your job. After a time, all you anticipate from colleagues as you enter a shared 
office is ridicule and condemnation. The prospect of their being welcoming or supportive 
never enters the picture. Eventually, you receive a letter of dismissal from the head of the 
company, along with a request to attend a meeting during which the terms of your departure 
will be negotiated. As you enter the meeting, losing your job is taken as given; it is inevitable. 
The prospect of staying on, of succeeding, of feeling comfortable and fulfilled in your 
working environment never even crosses your mind. You are going; no other possibilities 
present themselves. Hence, the only remaining issues concern the terms of your departure 
and, as you plead, that is all you plead for. When you are offered one of the less painful 
GHSDUWXUHRSWLRQV\RXH[SUHVVJUDWLWXGHDQGUHOLHISHUKDSVHYHQDOLPLWHGµWUXVW¶LQWKLV
individual, but only within the context of a wider absence of possibilities, including those 
possibilities your colleagues might otherwise have offered.  
 It could well be that some requests for psychiatric euthanasia are similar in structure 
to this. A SV\FKLDWULVW¶VUHIXVDOWRWDNHVHULRXVO\WKHSDWLHQW¶VUHTXHVWIRUHXWKDQDVLDPLJKW
itself be a source of distress, while the consideration and even approval of that request might 
be a source of comfort (Verhofstadt, Thienpont, & Peters, 2017). In the latter case, it may 
also seem that the patient trusts the doctor, that she has come to a reasoned decision, and that 
the doctor-patient relationship is a good one. Nevertheless, the potential role played by a 
backdrop of absent possibilities also needs to be acknowledged. In a world that is no longer 
populated by certain kinds of imagined and anticipated interaction with others, it could be 
WKDWWKHRQO\RSWLRQVOHIWRQWKHWDEOHLQYROYHHLWKHUKDYLQJRQH¶VGHVSDLUYLQGLFDWHGRUKDYLQJ
it exacerbated by yet another dismissal.8 However, there remains question as to whether or 
not one retains the capacity to be affected by others in ways that have the potential to re-
instill some sense of hope. The loss of possibilities may be context-sensitive to varying 
degrees. In some instances, at least, it is not something that can be assessed in isolation from 
styles of interaction with other people, including those charged with assessing capacity. Any 
attempt on the part of the clinician to assess capacity will thus require skillful interaction with 
the patient. Where a patient cannot imagine or anticipate experiencing certain kinds of 
interpersonal relation, perhaps she really is incapable. Then again, it could be that what she is 
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able to imagine and anticipate does not reflect what she is able to experience. Here, clinician-
patient interactions may harbor the potential to rekindle types of possibility that are currently 
absent from experience and thought, upon which decision-making capacity depends. 
&RQYHUVHO\FRQILUPLQJDSDWLHQW¶VVXIIHULQg to be untreatable risks consolidating the loss of 
possibilities: there really is no prospect of improvement. 
 
THE INTERPERSONAL CONTEXT OF PSYCHIATRIC EUTHANASIA 
The issues raised here are not merely hypothetical; publicly available information suggests 
that many actual cases are consistent with the phenomenological account I have offered. 
Social isolation and loneliness are prominent and consistent themes in the self-narratives of 
those requesting psychiatric euthanasia. Kim, De Vries, & Peteet (2016) report that, in the 66 
UHFRUGVWKH\H[DPLQHGPRVWRIWKRVHFRQFHUQHGµKDGSHUVRQDOLW\GLVRUGHUVDQGZHUH
GHVFULEHGDVVRFLDOO\LVRODWHGRUORQHO\¶S&DVHUHSRUWVLQFOXGHGREVHUYDWLRQVVXFKDV
µWKHSDWLHQWLQGLFDWHGWKDWVKHKDGKDGDOLIHZLWKRXWORYHDQGWKHUHIRUHKDGQRULJKWWRH[LVW¶
DQGµWKHSDWLHQWZDVDQXWWHUO\ORQHO\PDQZKRVHOLIHKDGEHHQDIDLOXUH¶S$OWKRXJK
brief, these remarks point to a sense of alienation from the social world, of the kind that I 
have suggested is inextricable from inability to entertain certain kinds of significant 
possibility. Berghmans, Widdershoven, & Widdershoven-Heerding (2013, pp. 439-40) 
FRQVLGHURQHFDVHLQGHWDLOQRWLQJWKDWWKHSDWLHQWFRQFHUQHGµGLGQRWSDUWLFLSDWHLQDQ\VRFLDO
DFWLYLWLHV¶µZDVXQDEOHWRDSSUHFLDWHDQ\WKLQJ¶DQGµUHSHDWHGO\LQGLFDWHGWKDWVKHGLGQRW
ZLVKWRFRQWLQXHOLYLQJWKLVZD\¶They add that, according to one of the psychiatrists 
involved, the SHUVRQµQRORQJHUKDGKRSHVRIVXFFHVVLQDOOHYLDWLQJKHUVWDWHRIPLQG¶DQGWKDW 
KHUOLIHµODFNHGDOOTXDOLW\DVVKHZDVXQDEOHWRDGMXVWWRDQ\VLWXDWLRQ¶In this case, the 
SDWLHQW¶VUHTXHVWZDVDSSURYHd and assistance-in-dying was provided. I have suggested that 
the proper interpretation and appraisal of such testimonies hinges on the distinction between 
DFFXUDWHO\UHFRJQL]LQJRQH¶VOLIHWREHZLWKRXWKRSHDQGWDNLQJLWWREHZLWKRXWKRSHEHFDXVH
one is currently unable to contemplate relevant alternatives.   
Furthermore, the unbearable suffering, to which euthanasia is sometimes deemed an 
appropriate response, seems to consist largely in an overwhelming sense of estrangement, 
isolation, and hopelessness. Verhofstadt, Thienpont, & Peters (2017) examine the unsolicited 
written or spoken accounts of 26 patients who requested euthanasia, with a view to clarifying 
the nature of their suffering. Five prominent dimensions of suffering are distinguished: 
µPHGLFDOLQWUDSHUVRQDOLQWHUSHUVRQDOVRFLHWDODQGH[LVWHQWLDO¶+RSHOHVVQHVVLVDOVR
REVHUYHGWREHDQµLPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWRU¶S.238). On closer inspection, all these 
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WKHPHVDSSHDUWREHERXQGXSZLWKLQWHUSHUVRQDORUVRFLDOUHODWLRQV(YHQWKHµLQWUDSHUVRQDO¶
LQFOXGHVWKHOLNHVRIµWUDXPDWLFEDFNJURXQGKLVWRU\¶LQYROYLQJSDVWHYHQWVWKDWDUHPRVWO\
interpersonal in nature. As for H[SOLFLWO\µLQWHUSHUVRQDO¶IDFWRUVLWLVQRWHGWKDWWHVWLPRQLDOV
UHIHUWRµVHULRXVFRQIOLFWVRUGLVUXSWLRQVZLWKLPSRUWDQWRWKHUVSDUHQWVSDUWQHUVDQGRU
FKLOGUHQERWKLQWKHSDVWDQGWKHSUHVHQW¶S%HUHDYHPHQWVDUHDOVRPHQWLRQHGDV
is ODFNRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGVXSSRUWIURPRWKHUVDQGEHLQJDµEXUGHQ¶RQWKHP7KHFDWHJRU\
RIµVRFLHWDO¶VXIIHULQJLQFOXGHVµVXIIHULQJUHODWHGWRRQH¶VSODFHDQGLQWHUDFWLRQLQVRFLHW\¶
including financial problems, work-related issues, and adjusting to society more generally. 
Again, this cannot be disentangled from how one anticipates, experiences, and relates to other 
people. Then there is existential suffering, which includes feeling overwhelmed, fearing life, 
and losing control. In considering what such feelings consist of, we should keep in mind the 
regulatory roles that interpersonal relations more usually play in preventing, controlling, and 
responding to such experiences. We feel overwhelmed when we are under pressure and 
unsupported; we fear life when we experience others as uniformly hostile; and we lose 
control when we cannot rely on others and the world becomes unpredictable, unmanageable.  
Turning to medical suffering, where this is largely attributable to a condition such as 
µGHSUHVVLRQ¶LWFDQQot be extricated from the interpersonal dimensions of the illness: the 
suffering is unbearable because it seems endless; it seems endless because one cannot 
entertain alternative possibilities; and an inability to entertain alternative possibilities is, at 
the same time, a pervasive estrangement from others. Verhofstadt, Thienpont, & Peters 
(2017, p.243) emphasize the need to distinguish hopelessness as a symptom of depression 
IURPKRSHOHVVQHVVDVDUDWLRQDODSSUDLVDORIRQH¶VVLWXDWLRQ+RZHYHUZKHUHWKHsituation to 
EHHYDOXDWHGLQYROYHVRQH¶VEHLQJFKURQLFDOO\VHYHUHO\GHSUHVVHGDQGXQOLNHO\WRUHFRYHUWKH
distinction cannot be sustained. A rational appraisal would involve feeling hopeless about 
RQH¶VVWDWHRIKRSHOHVVQHVVZKHUHWKHODWWHUSURKLELWVRne from feeling anything else in a way 
that is non-rational. 
The phenomenological account developed here is also supported by studies of what it 
LVWRIHHOVXLFLGDO3V\FKLDWULFHXWKDQDVLDLQFOXGLQJµDVVLVWHGG\LQJ¶GLIIHUVLQLPSRUWDQW
respects from most of those suicides attributable to psychiatric illness: it involves the 
expression of a consistent, long-WHUPµSUHIHUHQFH¶ZKLFKLVGLVFXVVHGDWOHQJWKZLWKUHOHYDQW
professionals and -most likely- others too, culminating in legal approval and practical 
support. Even so, those requesting psychiatric euthanasia often have a history of suicide 
attempts, while others go on to commit suicide before or after the request is granted, or after 
it is refused. It is therefore highly likely that the underlying phenomenology and motivating 
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factors are similar in many cases. Benson et al. (2016) examine the first-person accounts of 
people who have attempted suicide, their friends and family, and others who have been 
bereaved by suicide. They draw out three common themeVµODFNRIWUXVW¶µODFNRILQKHUHQW
ZRUWK¶DQGZKDWWKH\FDOOµVXLFLGDOH[KDXVWLRQ¶%\µWUXVW¶DQGµZRUWK¶WKH\GRQRWPHDQ
specifically directed attitudes but pervasive and deep-rooted aspects of self- and other-
experience that are more usually taken as given. It is exhausting to live without trusting 
relationships or an underlying sense of self-worth. Suicidal exhaustion thus arises from the 
RYHUDUFKLQJVWUXFWXUHRIRQH¶VOLIHIURPVRPHWKLQJWKDWVHHPVXQDYRLGDEOHDQGLQHVFDSDEOH
Hence, the movement towards suicide differs from a motivated decision, made against the 
backdrop of an intact possibility-space. According to Benson, Gibson, & Brand (2013, pp.56-
WKHUHLVDµGLVUXSWLRQLQWKHH[SHULHQFHRIWKHVHOIDVDQDJHQW¶µDIXQGDPHQWDOFKDQJHLQ 
WKHSHUVRQ¶VH[SHULHQWLDOEDFNJURXQGVXFKWKDWQRWKRXJKWSHUFHSWLRQRUHPRWLRQDOUHVSRQVH
LVOHIWFRPSOHWHO\XQFKDQJHG¶µDUHRULHQWDWLRQRIWKHZKROHRIRQH¶VH[LVWHQFHUDWKHUWKDQ
VLPSO\DZLVKWRGLHE\RQH¶VRZQKDQG¶ 
Feeling suicidal in this way is thus bound up with a loss of possibility and consequent 
VHQVHRIRQH¶VSUHGLFDPHQWDVRWKHUZLVHLQHVFDSDEOHDVVXJJHVWHGE\ILUVW-person 
descriptions such as these: 
 
I almost always feel suicidal for at least some of the time when I am feeling depressed. 
0\OLIHIHHOVKRSHOHVVDVLIWKHUH¶VQRSRLQWLQFRQWLQXLQJEHFDXVH,¶PQHYHUJRLQJWR
get better or be able to change. 
 
When depressed my thoughts about life are very negative, unhappy, self-critical, 
XQEDODQFHGDQGGLVWRUWHGFRPSDUHGWRZKHQ,¶PQRW depressed. I think about how my 
life seems empty, unsuccessful, lonely, limited, poverty stricken, grief stricken, 
XQIXOILOOLQJDQGSRLQWOHVVHVSHFLDOO\ZKHQFRPSDUHGZLWKRWKHUSHRSOH¶VOLYHVDURXQG
me. The worst part of thinking and therefore feeling this way when depressed is the 
complete lack of hope I attribute to every part of my life and the whole of life in 
general. This makes life unbearable and my thoughts turn to suicide. 
 
You feel tempted to end the suffering - however this is not a calculated decision (to end 
WKHVXIIHULQJLWLVDIHHOLQJDVWKRXJKLW¶VDQDWXUDOQH[WVWHSWRWDNHMXVWOLNHDQLPDOV
seek solitude to die). 
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 When someone is granted psychiatric euthanasia, is that person really incurable? That 
may well be the case sometimes. Nevertheless, the suffering in question often consists, to a 
large extent, in the loss of interpersonal possibilities. So, it is not to be conceived of in terms 
of an illness plus its impact on interpersonal relations. Rather, it is permeated through and 
through by how the person experiences and relates to (or fails to relate to) others. A pervasive 
sense of estrangement from other people is also integral to impaired decision-making 
capacity, given its inextricability from loss of possibilities. Hence, the task of determining 
whether suffering really is unbearable and untreatable is inextricable from that of somehow 
determining whether or not certain kinds of self-transformative interpersonal relations are 
most likely forever beyond a SHUVRQ¶VUHDFK Where that is so, I have suggested that capacity 
will also be lacking. Therefore, whether or not psychiatric euthanasia should be considered in 
such a scenario then depends, in part, on whether RQHFRQWLQXHVWRLQVLVWRQLQWDFWµFDSDFLW\¶
as a requirement.  
To summarize, I have argued that, when evaluating psychiatric euthanasia as a 
response to unbearable suffering, we need to acknowledge the existence of cases where (a) a 
sense of the suffering as endless is intrinsic to its being unbearable; (b) its endlessness is 
constituted by loss of access to possibility; (c) loss of access to possibility erodes the capacity 
to make life-decisions; and (d) loss of possibility (with consequent loss of capacity) is 
inextricable from an inability to imagine, anticipate, and / or participate in certain types of 
interpersonal relation. I have not challenged the practice of psychiatric euthanasia per se. 
Rather, I have argued that, if capacity on the part of the patient is to be insisted upon as a 
requirement for approval, then psychiatric euthanasia should not be approved in these cases. 
It is not at all clear from the relevant literature that the practitioners concerned are sufficiently 
sensitive to the distinction. Furthermore, certain descriptions of patients who have requested 
euthanasia strongly suggest that their suffering takes the form I have described. Additional 
issues arise once it is acknowledged that psychiatric suffering, loss of possibilities, and loss 
of capacity are bound up with how a person experiences and relates to others. This calls into 
question an individualistic conception of capacity and also complicates the task of 
measurement. 
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1
 For representative examples of news reports, see The Guardian newspaper 
(www.theguardian.com/society/2018/mar/17/assisted-dying-euthanasia-netherlands) and the BBC News 
website: (www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-45117163), both accessed 22.01.2019. Excerpts from interviews with 
Aurelia Brouwers, recorded by the Dutch network RTL News, appear with English translations in this BBC 
Radio 4 documentary: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0bdb9qk (last accessed 22.01.2019). 
2
 See also Grisso and Appelbaum (1998). For phenomenological studies of mental capacity that draw on this 
definition, see Owen, Freyenhagen, Hotopf, & Martin (2015, p.177); Hindmarch, Hotopf, & Owen (2013, p.1); 
Meynen (2011, p.182). 
3
 The questionnaire study was conducted as part of the AGRC- and DFG-IXQGHGSURMHFWµ(PRWLRQDO([SHULHQFH
LQ'HSUHVVLRQ¶-2012). For details, see Ratcliffe (2015, Chapter 1).  
4
 In a discussion of depression, capacity, and treatment-refusal, Sullivan & Youngner (1994, p.971) are sensitive 
to this crucial GLVWLQFWLRQVWDWLQJWKDWµGHSUHVVLYHKRSHOHVVQHVVFDQPDNHLWLPSRVVLEOHWRLPDJLQHWKDWOLIHZLOO
ever offer a bettHUEDODQFHRISOHDVXUHDQGSDLQWKDQLWGRHVDWSUHVHQW¶ 
5
 6HHDOVR0DUWLQDQG+LFNHUVRQIRUDGLVFXVVLRQRIµWHPSRUDOFDSDFLWLHV¶DQGWKHDELOLW\WRWDNHDFFRXQW
RIµIXWXUHVXEMXQFWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQ¶ 
6
 See Wyllie (2005, p.182) for an interesting discussion of how an altered sense of time in severe depression 
FRQWULEXWHVWRRQH¶VVXIIHULQJE\PDNLQJLWVHHPHQGOHVV6HHalso Broome (2005).  
7
 See Svenaeus (2018) for a detailed, discerning, and wide-ranging discussion of the phenomenology of 
suffering. 
8
 See also Blikshavn, Husum, & Magelssen (2017) for the concern that considering a request for psychiatric 
HXWKDQDVLDULVNVYLQGLFDWLQJGHVSDLU7KH\REVHUYHWKDWKRSHFDQEHµWKHUDSHXWLF¶DQGWKDWWKHUHLVWKHUHIRUHWKH
ULVNRIDµVHOI-IXOILOOLQJSURSKHF\¶ZKHQFOLQLFLDQVFRQFHGHWKDWWKHUHLVQRKRSHRILPSURYHPHQW 
                                                             
